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Aid, Aid Volatility and Sectoral Growth in sub-Saharan Africa: Does Finance Matter? 
 
Abstract 
This article examines the impact of aid and its volatility on sectoral growth by relying on 
panel dataset of 37 sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries for the period 1983–2014. Findings 
from the system-generalised methods of moments (GMM) show that, while foreign aid 
significantly drives sectoral growth, aid volatility deteriorates sectoral value additions 
impacting heavily on non–tradable sectors with no apparent effect on the agricultural sector. 
The deleterious effect of aid volatility on sectoral value additions in SSA is weakened by a 
well–developed financial system with significant impact on the tradable sector. Evidently, 
development of domestic financial markets enhances aid effectiveness.  
 
Keywords: Official Development Assistance (ODA), Aid, Volatility, Sectoral growth, sub-
Saharan Africa 
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1.0 Introduction 
Official Development Assistance (ODA), in its various forms, continues to serve as one of 
the largest aspect of foreign capital flows to sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries. In fact, the 
region receives about 35% of total ODA and hosts thirteen out of the twenty largest ODA 
recipients. In 2012, SSA received a total of US$49.5 billion representing 33% of gross ODA 
while Country Programmable Aid (CPA) also increased significantly by 13% between 2012 
and 2013 (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 2015). The 
question of how ODA affects economic growth of countries in SSA has received enormous 
scholarly attention over the years (Rodrik, 1990; Ojiambo et al., 2015). What is evident from 
the results of the growing body of empirical studies are that the effects of ODA on growth 
vary widely. 
Firstly, one strand of literature (Hatemi and Irandoust, 2005; Easterly, 2005; Armah and Carl, 
2008; Minoiu and Reddy, 2010) found that ODA helps in the promotion of economic growth 
through increases in investments and capacity to import goods and technology, complement 
and supplement domestic resources and saving as well as augment capital productivity. Thus, 
ODA helps in bridging the saving-investment gap confronting many developing countries. By 
employing an Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) model, Gounder (2001) found that aid 
flows in its various forms had a significantly positive impact on economic growth in Fiji. 
ODA also contribute to economic growth through domestic capital formation 
supplementation, public investment and human capital development, and increase in physical 
and human capital investment and also provides an opportunity to import capital goods and 
technology in recipient countries (Hansen and Tarp, 2001; Morrissey, 2001; McGillivray, 
2009).  
Other studies however found that there is a marginal or negative relationship between ODA 
and economic growth (see Mallik, 2008; Young and Sheehan, 2014). Knack (2001) for 
instance found that increased volumes of aid had the potential to increase corruption and rent-
seeking behavior of state actors, erode institutional quality which by implication affects 
growth negatively. Using a sample of 39 developing between 1975 and 2000, Duc (2006) 
found a significant negative relationship between aid and economic growth. The other strand 
of empirical studies (Hansen and Tarp 20001; Nkusu and Sayek, 2004; Ekanayake and 
Chatrna, 2010; De La Croix and Delavallade, 2013; Young and Sheehan, 2014) note the 
inconclusiveness with respect to the relationship between aid and growth.  
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Ekanayake and Chatrna (2010) found that foreign aid had a mixed impact on economic 
growth of developing countries. Adams and Atsu (2014) equally found mixed results: in the 
short-run, aid promotes growth through investments and government spending while in the 
long-run, trade and financial depth has negative effects on growth. What is evident from these 
strand of literature is that country-specific factors or internal dynamics including financial 
markets, policy environments, quality of governance structures, resource endowment, culture 
and socio-economic characteristics are major determinants of the effectiveness or counter 
productiveness of aid to growth (Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Winters and Martinez, 2015).   
In the light of these growing contestations of the nexus between ODA and growth is the lack 
of scholarly attention on aid volatility or unpredictability, a major feature of ODA flow that 
has consequential implications on growth. The studies reviewed above inherently agree that 
ODA flows are unpredictable and that recipient countries, through conscious policy 
strategies, can effectively and timely leverage aid in their national development financing 
agenda. The studies further assume that aid disbursement and commitments are the same. In 
fact, the experiences with many SSA countries suggest that aid volatility exist and can have 
either negative or positive implication on growth depending on the factors that triggered it. 
Indeed factors that trigger aid volatility may be numerous ranging from: a) failure of recipient 
countries to adhere to donor conditionalities in safeguarding aid; b) inability of donors to 
disburse timely owing administrative constraints; c) changing donor priorities which results 
in addition or subtraction and d) shocks in the economy which may necessitate donors to 
provide more aid than the agreed commitment (Celasun and Walliser, 2008).  
The discussion on aid sector volatility is important as it could have serious implications on 
growth. For example, aid volatility could force government to cut investments in areas 
including human capital development or boost government consumption (Celasun and 
Walliser, 2008). Rodrik (1990) argues that aid volatility may results in volatility of 
expenditure and policy instability especially among poor aid-dependent countries while 
Mosley and Suleiman (2007) also suggest that aid volatility reduces fiscal policies and 
coherent investment programmes in the public sector in recipient countries. Informed by 
these strands of view, some commentators have argued that aid volatility negatively affects 
the effectiveness of aid at the macro-economic level (Lensink and Morrissey, 2000) and it 
leads to macroeconomic instability (Chauvet and Guillaumont, 2009).  
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Ojiambo et al. (2015) examined the heterogeneous effects of aid on growth in low income 
economies with different aid unpredictability episodes. The authors found that increased in 
aid volatility has negative effects on growth. They however also found that aid volatility 
improves economic growth in an unstable macroeconomic environment, a finding they 
attributed to the point that aid volatility forces government to adopt more prudent measures to 
manage limited resources during unstable periods. No evidence was reported of different 
impacts of aid volatility during shocks. Other studies have also suggested that the results of 
aid volatility on growth are mixed (Hudson and Mosley, 2008; Hudson, 2013).  
While these studies offer insight on the effect of aid volatility, they failed to disaggregate the 
impacts of aid volatility on sectoral value additions. Thus, to the best of our knowledge, little 
is known about the effects of aid volatility on specific sectors of the economy including 
agriculture, services and industry.  The objective of this paper is to go beyond the debates on 
aid volatility–growth nexus and to examine the effect of aid volatility on sectoral outputs. 
Indeed, individual sectoral effects of aid volatility matters in the same manner as overall aid 
volatility because merely regressing aid on economic growth is not instructive, hence the 
need for an in-depth knowledge and understanding into how an individual sector is uniquely 
affected. We are inspired by works of authors such as Hudson (2015), who examined the 
effects of aid and aid volatility on specific sectors using database of 50 sectors from the 
OECD Creditor Reporting System. He found that when debt and humanitarian aid are 
ignored, the most volatile sectors are linked to government and industry but other social 
sectors including health and education have low volatilities. The author however called for 
more studies on aid volatility and sectoral value output.  
Indeed, beyond the traditional role of financial sector development in improving ex ante 
information of an underlying investment, mobilizing savings, monitoring corporate 
governance, trading and risk diversification (see Levine, 1997; 2005), our paper attempts to 
proffer alternative role of domestic financial market where higher level of financial sector 
development mediates countries’ ability to mitigate the effect of aid volatility in such a way 
that sectoral growth is not jeopardized. In fact, the role of financial sector development in 
faltering growth volatility has much attention in recent literature (see for instance Ibrahim 
and Alagidede, 2017). However, beyond finance–growth volatility nexus, we argue in this 
study that, well-developed domestic financial markets allow the conduct of effective 
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monetary policies necessary for dampening the private sector growth associated with vagaries 
of aid inflows. 
We contribute significantly to literature. Incorporating aid volatility into the standard aid–
growth framework will provide an indication of the extent to which aid vagaries may have 
eroded sectoral output over the period under consideration, where the region has received 
substantial ODA. Undoubtedly, our study provides a strong alternative to examining aid–
growth relationship in SSA. More specifically, our study focuses on sub-sector effects of aid 
and aid volatility and how financial sector development impact on volatility–sector output 
nexus. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study attempting to quantify the unique 
impact of aid and its volatility of the various sectors of SSA as well as the role of domestic 
financial market in magnifying or amplifying the impact of aid volatility on sectoral value 
addition. In doing so, we deal with the question of whether aid and its volatility have 
counteracting effect on the agricultural, service and manufacturing sectors of the economy. 
The remainder of the study is organized as follows: Section two examines trends of aid 
volatility and its impact of sectoral value additions in the context of SSA.  This 
contextualization will help situate our study in broader context by offering an insight into the  
predictability or unpredictability of ODA flows and the extent to which that affect growth on 
the continent. We then outline our methods, data and empirical strategy, followed by results 
and discussions. The last part concludes the study with some policy implications. 
2.0 Trends of ODA, sectoral growth and financial sector development  in SSA  
The growing emphasis on ODA in Africa can be best understood in the context of the poverty 
and under-development in the sub-region. Poverty ranks as one of the region’s most pressing 
development challenges. An estimated 48.5% of SSA’s population subsists on less than 
US$1.25 a day. With almost 910.4 million people, the region has, by far the highest poverty 
rate in the world with about 65% of the population being multi-dimensionally poor (UNDP, 
2011; World Bank, 2012). This makes Africa the signifier of poverty and sometimes the 
connection with poverty often close to elision (Harrison, 2011). Moreover, countries in SSA 
occupy most of the bottom places in many human development indicators including life 
expectancy, maternal mortality and literacy rates (UNDP, 2015).  
This situation coupled with weak institutional and governance structures has created a 
‘development void’ where foreign donors including bilateral and multilateral agencies have 
sought to fill through the provision of ODA. The institutionalisation of aid can also be seen as 
6 
 
a mechanism for creating interaction between developed and less-developed countries. This is 
also not to downplay the fact that donor agencies may not necessarily allocate aid flow to the 
neediest regions or countries but are influenced in part by their political and strategic 
considerations including the rhetoric of better governance, fiscal sustainability and 
accountability (Collier and Dollar, 2002; Harrigan et al., 2006).  
As noted earlier Africa, south of the Sahara, is one of the regions in the world that continue to 
receive huge volumes of aid. However flow of Aid to the region has been volatile over the 
years with implications on overall growth and above all, sectoral value additions.  Figure 1 
below shows the trend analysis of sectoral additions in SSA over the period 1981 to 2015. 
From the Figure, we notice marked increases in sectoral value additions especially in 2015. 
More importantly, over the sample period, average sectoral value addition is at 2.1 and 3.8 
times higher than that of agriculture and manufacturing sectors respectively (see Table 1). 
Indeed, value additions in manufacturing and agriculture are relatively lower and lackluster 
even the later is higher. What is clear from the Figure is that that, growth in agriculture value 
additions is non-monotonic although the trend is generally decreasing over the period. The 
agriculture sector recorded its highest value addition of 24.28% between 1986–1990 which 
coincided with the period the service sector registered its lowest value addition of 42.71% 
(see Table 1).  
Interestingly, we observed a lowest value addition of 17.73% in agricultural sector and aid 
inflows (as a percentage of GNP) of 3.02% for the period 2011–2015 which also coincided 
with the period where the service sector recorded its all-time highest value addition of 
55.85%. Manufacturing value addition has been consistently reducing from 14.69% in 1981–
1985 to 10.47% in 2011 – 2015 although this rate represented a slight increase from 10.17% 
in 2006–2010. The lower manufacturing value addition is expected given the region’s 
economic structure in terms of reliance on agriculture which is biased towards production of 
raw materials relative to manufacturing. Values of financial development indicators show that 
average domestic credit provided by financial sector (% of GDP) is consistently larger than 
domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) with an overall mean of 64.99%. 
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Figure 1: Trend of sectoral value additions in SSA 
 
Source: Authors’ construct from WDI. 
Table 1: ODA, financial development and sectoral value additions in SSA 
Year 
Net ODA 
received 
(% of 
GNI) 
Domestic 
credit to 
private 
sector (% of 
GDP) 
Domestic 
credit 
provided 
by 
financial 
sector (% 
of GDP) 
Agriculture, 
value added 
(% of GDP) 
Manufacturing, 
value added (% 
of GDP) 
Services, 
etc., 
value 
added 
(% of 
GDP) 
1981 - 1985 3.40 34.90 53.16 24.16 14.69 43.40 
1986 - 1990 5.12 40.79 56.61 24.28 13.86 42.71 
1991 - 1995 6.06 55.92 70.19 23.52 12.64 43.32 
1996 - 2000 4.17 58.25 70.21 22.58 11.73 43.92 
2001 - 2005 5.09 55.47 74.65 22.47 11.67 46.29 
2006 - 2010 4.28 59.21 70.02 19.99 10.17 49.80 
2011 - 2015 3.02 47.69 60.08 17.73 10.47 55.85 
1981 - 2015 4.45 50.32 64.99 22.10 12.18 46.47 
Source: Authors’ calculations from WDI. 
The analyses here show some revealing evidence of inter-relationships among aid inflows 
and sectoral growth where financial system may provide intermediation roles. 
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4.0 Data and Methodology 
 
4.1 Data and preliminary findings 
 
To test our hypothesis, we construct a balanced panel dataset of 37 SSA countries for the 
period 1983–2014.1 The choice of these countries is based entirely on data availability for a 
sufficiently longer time period. Annual data for all the variables were gleaned from the World 
Development Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank. We used ODA to GDP ratio to proxy 
foreign aid. Sectoral growth is proxied by the real value added output in agriculture, service 
and manufacturing. Specifically, value addition in the agricultural sector is the net output of a 
sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs while that of the service 
sector include value added in wholesale and retail trade (including hotels and restaurants), 
transport, and government, financial, professional, and personal services such as education, 
health care, and real estate services. Manufacturing sector value added which comprises of 
value additions in manufacturing, mining, construction, electricity, water and gas. Indeed, 
sectoral value additions are computed as the net output of a sector after summing all outputs 
and subtracting intermediate inputs. The origin of value added is determined by the 
International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), revision 3 and annual growth rate for 
all sectors are based on constant 2005 U.S. dollars.  
We present the distribution of aid and the various sectoral outputs in the Appendix. We used 
credit provided by financial sector to the private sector as percentage of GDP to proxy the 
quality of financial development. Our control variables are based on the standard neoclassical 
growth theory and include inflation, investment rate, government expenditure, institutional 
quality, labour and trade openness. The inflation variable is the annual percentage change in 
the consumer price index and used to proxy macroeconomic (in)stability. This is expected to 
negatively impact on sectoral growth. We use gross fixed capital formation as a percentage of 
GDP to proxy investment rates and this is expected to positively influence sectoral value 
additions. Government expenditure expressed as a percentage of GDP measures final 
government consumption expenditure and used to measure government size. The institutional 
quality variable is a continuous variable ranging from 0 to 4, with a higher score indicating a 
better quality.  
                                                             
1 These countries are Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cameroon, Burundi, Congo, Rep., Cote 
d'Ivoire, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Dem. Rep., Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Gambia, The, Guinea-
Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritius, Malawi, Nigeria, Niger,  Namibia, Mozambique, 
Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Uganda, Zimbabwe and  
Zambia. 
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Obtained from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), this is used to measure the 
quality of government institutions that affect property rights or the ability to conduct 
business. Labour is proxied by the percentage of economically active population aged 15 to 
64 years. We provide the descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients of the variables in 
Appendices D and E respectively. 
4.2 Modelling aid volatility 
Some authors (see for instance, Chervin and van Wijnbergen, 2010; Markandya et al., 2010; 
Ojiambo et al., 2015) have used the standard deviations where aid volatility is measured 
according to the degree to it deviates along the mean trend. However, this measure assumes 
that, aid inflows is normally distributed empirically and obscures the distribution between 
unpredictable elements of the aid process hence failing to capture the past information of aid 
inflow. We therefore estimate a time–varying volatility on account of the weaknesses of the 
traditional standard deviation measure. In this study, we rely on the generalised 
autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) developed by Bollerslev (1986) 
largely because it captures past values of the aid and corrects for the intrinsic weaknesses of 
the traditional measure. Similar to Alagidede and Ibrahim (2017), we allow the log of aid to 
depend on its previous value for the mean equation, we derive our GARCH model as follows: 
 
      (1) 
              ~ iid N(0, )  
         (2) 
where , 0 and  0 
 
Therefore, our conditional variance  captures the mean ( ), information about the previous 
volatility,  (ARCH term) and the past forecast error variance,  (GARCH term). Our 
GARCH model permits the error term to assume a time–varying variance contingent on the 
past behaviour of aid inflows. Values of the extracted conditional variance of aid are used to 
proxy aid volatility and used in all subsequent estimations. 
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Figure 2: Foreign aid volatility 
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Source: Authors’ construct using WDI. 
 
Figure 2 above shows the trend of aid volatility extracted via GARCH. It is clear over the 
sample period that aid to SSA has been volatile and persistent with deep negative ditch 
recorded in the year 2000. 
 
4.3 Empirical strategy 
Empirically, regression models are used to study the relationship between aid and growth. 
Following this, we specify equation (3) below where sectoral growth depends on the level of 
aid inflows and other conditioning variables. 
                 (3) 
where  is sector growth of country i at time t;   is aid;  is aid volatility  is 
a vector of control variables;  is the error term while t and i are time and country indices 
respectively. 
We examine the sectoral effect of aid and aid volatility by setting a baseline model where 
sector growth depends on its one period lag, aid and its volatility and a set of controls 
estimated in equation (4) below; 
              (4) 
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where  is the sector growth lag representing the initial conditions in examining 
convergence;  is the country–specific fixed effects;  is the time effects while  is the 
idiosyncratic error term.  
It is instructive to state that a significant problem exists in the aid–growth literature. And this 
relates to the possibility of obtaining biased results stemming from potential endogeneity of 
aid in respect to growth. Indeed, donor countries may incentivize a recipient country with a 
high level of sectoral growth by providing huge foreign aid. Conversely, some donor 
countries may also wish to channel large aid flows to slow–growing poor countries  and may 
also direct that a proportion of the inflows be channelled to a specific sector where they 
believe intrinsically lag behind relative to other sectors (Hepp, 2008). Thus, there might be a 
negative association between sectoral output value additions and aid inflows. Simultaneously, 
if some donor countries have higher preference for directing more aid to fast–growing 
countries and more specifically certain sectors of the economy, we expect a positive 
correlation between sectoral output and aid. In such framework, one might anticipate the 
other variables perceived to influence sectoral growth to potentially correlate with sectoral 
output.  
Apart from this, the majority of the active population of SSA’s labour force is more probable 
to engage in agriculture thereby increasing its sectoral output and freeing resources/inputs to 
other sectors notably the manufacturing. Moreover, relatively efficient sector players may 
demand improved institutional quality to allow sound service delivery hence boosting 
income. We resolve these potential endogeneities by employing the system generalised 
methods of moments (SYS–GMM). Specifically, we estimate equation (4) above by 
employing the SYS–GMM dynamic pooled estimator as it resolves the econometric problems 
inspired by endogeneity of the lagged dependent ( ) as well as potential unobserved 
country–specific effects. We rely on the SYS–GMM relative to the difference GMM due to 
the latter’s poor finite properties when the regressors are persistent (Arellano and Bover, 
1995).2 The main advantage for our choice of this approach is that, it provides more precision 
in the estimations as well as correcting for biases beset with existing studies on the aid–
growth nexus owing from the introduction of its extra moments. 
 
                                                             
2 Ibrahim and Alagidede (2017) also used this approach as a sensitivity check in their examination of the 
relationship among financial development, economic volatility and shocks in SSA.  
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Since all the regressors may be endogenous, we instrument with two lags of themselves in the 
first difference equation, and a one lag of their first difference in the level equation. We 
investigate the channels through which financial development magnifies or dampens aid 
volatility effect on sector growth by including a multiplicative interaction term of  and 
financial development. Consequently, we specify our general system GMM framework from 
equation (4) as: 
 
  
   
where  is the vector of parameters associated with each explanatory variable;  is the 
maximum lag in the model;  is financial development. The other variables remain as 
previously defined.  
Our panel SYS–GMM estimator relies on pooled cross–country and time series properties 
while utilizing additional information provided by the variations in the level of sectoral 
growth and associated factors influencing it. Indeed, the efficiency of our estimates depends 
on the validity of the instruments which we address using two formal tests: serial correlation 
test and Sargan’s test for over–identifying restriction. While the serial correlation test 
examines the null hypothesis that the error term is serially uncorrelated [whether first, AR(1) 
or second order, AR(2)], the Sargan’s test examines the exogeneity of the instruments with 
the null hypothesis that over–identifying restrictions are valid. 
5.0 Results and Discussions  
This section presents the empirical findings on aid–volatility–sectoral value additions nexus. 
Specifically, we regress sectoral growth proxied by real value additions of agriculture, service 
and industrial sector on their one period lag together with aid, aid volatility and other 
standard controls selected with recourse to standard literature. We also include the 
multiplicative interactive term of aid volatility and financial sector development. To eliminate 
time and country level heterogeneity in the sectoral value addition process, our estimations 
include time and country effect dummies and results from the SYS–GMM are presented in 
Tables 2 to 4 below. 
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Table 2: Aid, aid volatility and agricultural sector value additions 
Variables 
Agriculture 
1 2 3 4 
Lagged dependent –1.412(0.191)*** –1.393(0.174)*** –1.301(0.156)*** –1.222(0.294) *** 
Investment 0.052(0.033) 0.048(0.042) 0.037(0.028) 0.043(0.039) 
Government size 0.021(0.017) 0.017(0.016) 0.020(0.015) 0.019(0.013) 
Inflation –0.009(0.002) *** –0.010(0.005)** –0.021(0.009)** –0.018(0.006)** 
Trade openness 0.151(0.069)** 0.160(0.064)** 0.169(0.071)** 0.172(0.040) *** 
Labour 0.090(0.028) *** 0.081(0.012)*** 0.078(0.011)*** 0.079(0.039)** 
Institutional quality 0.099(0.016) *** 0.096(0.016)*** 0.111(0.012)*** 0.171(0.028) *** 
Aid  0.109(0.010) *** 0.121(0.059)** 0.160(0.022)*** 0.175(0.037) *** 
Aid volatility – –0.007(0.004)* –0.032(0.028) –0.018(0.014) 
Fin. development – – 0.157(0.131) – 
Channels:     
Volatility and fin. development – – – –0.031(0.024) 
Diagnostics:     
Number of countries 37 37 37 37 
Country fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Time effects YES YES YES YES 
AR(1) z–value [p–value] –3.023 [0.009] –3.129[0.005] –3.331[0.005] –3.412[0.007] 
AR(2) z–value [p–value] –1.319 [0.317] –1.422[0.419] –1.223[0.391] –1.412[0.201] 
Sagan chi-square [p–value] 10.091[0.241] 11.715[0.312] 14.812[0.472] 13.031[0.500] 
Wald chi-square [p–value] 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: ***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10% level. All variables are estimated in logs and coefficients are 
their respective elasticities. 
Table 3: Aid, aid volatility and service sector value additions 
Variables 
Service 
1 2 3 4 
Lagged dependent –1.019(0.311) *** –1.117(0.475)** –1.302(0.145)*** –1.537(0.275) *** 
Investment 0.071(0.023)** 0.075(0.030)** 0.081(0.033)** 0.078(0.029)** 
Government size 0.051(0.041) 0.057(0.054) 0.061(0.055) 0.062(0.031)* 
Inflation –0.016(0.004) *** –0.019(0.002)*** –0.020(0.002)*** –0.022(0.003) *** 
Trade openness 0.193(0.070)** 0.154(0.069)** 0.137(0.015)*** 0.110(0.050)*** 
Labour 0.071(0.034)** 0.076(0.032)** 0.071(0.029)** 0.082(0.041)** 
Institutional quality 0.073(0.031)** 0.081(0.014)*** 0.092(0.017)*** 0.091(0.020) *** 
Aid  0.016(0.008)* 0.027(0.013)** 0.048(0.021)** 0.0970(0.046)** 
Aid volatility – –0.063(0.026)** –0.045(0.019)** –0.051(0.019)** 
Fin. Development  – 0.151(0.022)*** – 
Channels:     
Volatility and fin. Devt – – – –0.048(0.017)** 
Diagnostics:     
Number of countries 37 37 37 37 
Country fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Time effects YES YES YES YES 
AR(1) z–value [p–value] –3.209[0.002] –3.514 [0.001] –3.607[0.001] –3.912[0.001] 
AR(2) z–value [p–value] –1.111[0.731] –1.931[0.549] –1.870[0.614] –1.763[0.553] 
Sagan chi-square [p–value] 14.018[0.414] 10.192[0.327] 13.044[0.411] 12.772[0.392] 
Wald chi-square [p–value] 0.000 0.000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: ***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10% level. All variables are estimated in logs and coefficients are 
their respective elasticities. 
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Table 4: Aid, aid volatility and manufacturing sector value additions 
Variables 
Manufacturing 
1 2 3 4 
Lagged dependent –1.102(0.129) *** –1.305(0.146)*** –1.611(0.202)*** –1.871(0.231) *** 
Investment 0.081(0.033)** 0.087(0.035)** 0.073(0.034)** 0.093(0.071) *** 
Government size 0.077(0.058) 0.052(0.051) 0.059(0.053) 0.061(0.049) 
Inflation –0.071(0.011) *** –0.066(0.026)** –0.059(0.023)** –0.062(0.009) *** 
Trade openness 0.241(0.041) *** 0.239(0.025)*** 0.250(0.030)*** 0.216(0.035) *** 
Labour 0.086(0.043)* 0.090(0.047)* 0.098(0.051)* 0.129(0.063)** 
Institutional quality 0.087(0.019) *** 0.090(0.010)*** 0.097(0.011)*** 0.096(0.022)*** 
Aid  0.026(0.009)** 0.030(0.013)** 0.041(0.018)** 0.033(0.012)** 
Aid volatility – –0.063(0.021)** –0.055(0.018)** –0.041(0.013)** 
Fin. Devt   0.142(0.014)*** – 
Channels:     
Volatility and fin. development    –0.055(0.013) *** 
Diagnostics:     
Number of countries 37 37 37 37 
Country fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Time effects YES YES YES YES 
AR(1) z–value [p–value] –3.477 [0.009] –3.096 [0.004] –3.111[0.001] –3.213[0.002] 
AR(2) z–value [p–value] –1.501 [0.301] –1.152[0.211] –1.532[0.240] –1.332[0.217] 
Sagan chi-square [p–value] 12.312[0.410] 15.442[0.291] 11.276[0.315] 12.900[0.421] 
Wald chi-square [p–value] 0.000 0.000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: ***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10% level. All variables are estimated in logs and coefficients are 
their respective elasticities. 
 
Conditional convergence hypothesizes that economies have a penchant of converging toward 
a steady–state path (Solow, 1956). In this study, we argue that sectoral output growth in SSA 
will depend on the initial value additions. Following this logic, we capture the conditional 
convergence effects by including the initial/lagged output levels of agriculture, service and 
manufacturing sectors in their respective models. From Tables 2 to 4, the coefficient of the 
respective lagged dependent of each sector is negative and significant at conventional levels 
predicting countries’ conditional convergence to their own steady state sectoral output. 
We introduced key variables in sessions to assess the stability and robustness of the effects on 
sectoral growth. Columns 1 to 4 in Table 2 present findings on how the independent variables 
affect real value additions of the agriculture sector. The coefficient of gross fixed capital 
formation is positive for all sectors but its effect on agricultural value addition is not 
significant. This is so irrespective of the model choice. With regard to the service sector, our 
finding suggests that a unit percentage increase in investment rate increases its value addition 
by at least 0.071% (column 1) and 0.081% for the manufacturing sector. In columns 2 and 3 
where we control for aid volatility and financial development, the growth effect of investment 
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rate on both service and manufacturing value additions increase.  This finding is unsurprising 
as investment in capital build up is expected to boost infrastructure thus paving way for the 
expansion in both sectors. The effect of fiscal policy proxied by government expenditure is 
positive albeit insignificantly suggesting that government expenditure does not matter in 
sectoral value addition. This evidence perhaps re-echoes the form of government expended in 
SSA and may reflect that quality relative to quantity of expenditure matter in propelling 
structural economic changes. This argument is well illustrated in Ibrahim and Alagidede 
(2016) where the authors opine that government expenditure in SSA is often on boondoggles 
and white elephants.  
In terms of the effect of macroeconomic instability proxied by inflation, our results indicate 
that increases in inflation is associated with reduced value additions in all the sectors. This 
finding is robust irrespective of the model specification suggesting that maintaining a stable 
macroeconomic environment is crucial in promoting sectoral growth. Turning to the effect of 
international openness on sectoral growth, our findings suggest that, de-restricting trade 
barriers can potentially increase value additions in all sectors with large effects in the 
manufacturing (see Table 4, columns 1 to 4). The effect of trade openness is insensitive to 
model specification given the robust positive effect on output. Beyond promoting 
competition, openness to international markets allows technological transfer permitting 
sectors to produce goods and services at lower unit costs. The effect of labour in output 
growth is positive and statistically significant suggesting that increasing population in region 
is associated with higher sectoral growth. Further findings show that higher institutional 
quality is output-enhancing. Specifically, increase in the quality of institutions promotes 
value additions in agriculture, service and the manufacturing sectors although higher effect is 
recorded in the agricultural sector. Apart from enhancing capacity, improvement in 
institutions alleviates structural bottlenecks inhibiting sectoral productivity ultimately 
spurring output. 
On aid–sectoral growth nexus, we find a positive and statistically significant effect of aid on 
agricultural output suggesting that aid inflows to SSA propels agricultural output. From Table 
2 in particular, a unit–percentage rise in aid significantly increases agricultural sector value 
addition by 0.109% (column 1). The positive effect of aid on agriculture remain robust even 
when we control for aid volatility (column 2), financial development (column 3) and 
transmission channel (column 4) with higher elasticity recorded in the model containing the 
indirect effect (column 4). Similarly, foreign aid is also associated with higher service and 
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manufacturing output. The elasticity effect of aid on the service sector ranges between 0.016 
to 0.097% relative to 0.026 to 0.041% of the manufacturing sector. Thus, foreign aid inflows 
propel structural economic transmission and may well reveal the interdependence of the 
various sectors in the production process.  
While the agricultural sector provides the inputs necessary for production while service sector 
provides the intermediation role by creating a sound enabling the environment for 
manufacturing to thrive. Indeed, those manufacturing industries that rely more heavily on 
service sector benefit from the efficient transportation services, ICT, energy and other service 
provision thereby spurring manufacturing output. Thus, apart from propelling agricultural 
sector production, the positive impact of aid suggests improvement in service provision 
permitting downstream users of these services. While aid promotes sectoral value additions, 
their effect is largely disproportionate. Notice that the effect of aid on agricultural output is 
large and increases substantially with a rather reduced magnitude on manufacturing. Given 
the highest effect of aid on each sector, the impact of foreign aid on agriculture is at least 1.8 
and 4.3 times higher than that of service and manufacturing sectors respectively. We attribute 
this to the high concentration of agriculture where additional resources potentially increase 
production. Defined as an income transfer to governments, to the extent that foreign aid 
permits increased public spending and investment, these findings are particularly apt as 
efficiency in services (dis)proportionally benefits all sectors although the output–enhancing 
effect on manufacturing is low perhaps due to the nascent manufacturing sector.  
We control for the direct effect of aid volatility on sectoral output and results are shown in 
columns 2 to 4. Our findings show a negative impact of aid volatility on agricultural, service 
and manufacturing output. The implication is that while aid promotes growth in these sectors, 
vagaries in aid dampen its enhancing–effect. From Table 2, column 2, a 1% rise in aid 
volatility reduces agricultural sector growth by 0.07% and this effect is slightly significant at 
10%.  However, the volatility–damaging effect on agriculture loses its significance when we 
control for financial development (column 3) and transmission channel (column 4). Thus, 
relative to service and manufacturing, the agricultural sector is immune from the adverse 
effects of unpredictable pattern of aid. This finding is akin to Chauvet and Guillaumont 
(2009). The author’s show that aid, even if aid is volatile, it is not as procyclical as is often 
argued, and, even if procyclical, it is not necessarily destabilizing with the (de)stabilizing 
nature of aid measured by the difference in the volatility of (i) exports and (ii) aid plus export 
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flows. To the extent that agricultural sector in SSA mainly provides inputs for other sectors in 
the processing and exporting sector perhaps explains the subtle effect of volatility.  
On the policy front, this finding highlights the need to avoid the apparent assumption that aid 
volatility has homogenous effects across different sectors of the economy as aid volatility–
sectoral growth nexus is heterogenous. While volatility may not have significant effect on 
one sector (such as agriculture), it may have a relatively smaller negative effect on one sector 
(such as service) thus hindering its improvement, while at the same time have negative and 
large effect on other sectors (such as manufacturing).  
In other words, although the coefficient of aid volatility is negative and significant (at 5%) for 
service and manufacturing sectors, its effect is huge in the former. These findings suggest that 
revenue volatility deteriorates output and can potentially present severe problems to 
developing economies like those in SSA. As argued by Mosley and Suleiman (2007), 
government of recipient country’s capacity to execute productive investments and fiscal 
policies is inhibited by aid fluctuations. With the revenue inflows of which a high proportion 
goes to poor countries as aid, fluctuations in aid may result in volatility of expenditure and 
instability of policy (Rodrik, 1990). Overall, our findings could explain why countries in SSA 
have made little progress transforming their structure despite the ODA inflows. 
Given the negative effects of volatility on sectoral value additions in SSA, this study 
hypothesizes that, improvements in domestic financial sector falters aid vagaries. We test this 
hypothesis by including a multiplicative interactive term of volatility and financial 
development proxied by credit to the private sector (column 4, Tables 2 to 4). Consistent with 
our hypothesis, we find a negative coefficient of the interactive term suggesting that countries 
with well–developed financial sectors are associated with lower volatility. This finding is 
somewhat akin to Nkusu and Sayek (2004). A plausible explanation from this study may be 
that, because aid provides more resources to governments of the recipient countries reduces 
their appetite to compete with the private sector for credit from the domestic financial sector 
thereby freeing credit to the private sector. However, the dampening effect of financial 
development is insignificant in the agricultural sector. Indeed, countries in SSA have high 
comparative advantage in agriculture (see Collier and Venables, 2007) and with majority of 
the agriculture-based economies having agriculture contribution to GDP averaging 34% 
(Hayami, 2005).  
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This notwithstanding, commercial banks in SSA lend less than 10% of their total credit to the 
agricultural sector with the exception of Malawi, Tanzania and Uganda (Mhlanga, 2010). 
However, manufacturing and industrial sectors are seen as sound destinations for bank 
lending because they are insulated from the inherent challenges faced by the agriculture 
sector. Agriculture creates special challenges for financial institutions due to its spatial and 
risk characteristics (see Meyer, 2011; Antonaci et al., 2014). However, financial sector 
programmes aimed at ameliorating these problems produced disappointing results (Meyer, 
2015) on the back of under–developed financial sector (Ibrahim and Alagidede, 2016). Thus, 
the inability of the region’s financial sector development to tame volatility in the agricultural 
sector is unsurprising.  
We turn to the reliability of the results. More specifically, the p–values of the Wald chi 
square statistic shows jointly significance of the all the regressors in the each model. Results 
from our diagnostic checks rejected the null hypotheses for the Sagan’s tests thus supporting 
the validity of the instruments. Our tests for first [AR(1)] and second [AR(2)] order–
correlation show absence of first–order serial correlation and the presence of AR(2) given the 
high (low) p–values (z–values). Our findings therefore provide some consistent and unbiased 
estimates given the valid instruments and robust results. 
6.0 Conclusion and Policy Implication 
Our purpose in this paper is to go beyond the debates on aid volatility–growth nexus and to 
examine the effect of aid and aid vagaries on sectoral value additions. More importantly, 
individual sectoral effect of aid volatility matters in the same manner as total aid volatility 
because merely regressing aid on economic growth is not instructive. This paper therefore 
examines the effect of aid and its volatility on sectoral growth in SSA using on a balanced 
panel dataset of 37 countries for the period 1983–2014. We resolve potential endogeneities in 
aid–sectoral growth nexus by employing the system generalised methods of moments (SYS–
GMM) while dealing with country-specific effects.  
Our findings show a positive and significant impact of aid on agricultural, service and 
manufacturing output suggesting that aid inflows to SSA propels sectoral value additions. In 
other words, foreign inflows spur both the tradable and non–tradable sectors revealing some 
degree of interdependence. This notwithstanding, aid volatility deteriorates sectoral value 
additions with huge impact on the non–tradable sector. However, aid vagaries do not appear 
to impact on the agricultural sector. The immunity of this sector from the ravages of the 
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unpredictable pattern of aid can be attributed to the comparative advantage the region already 
enjoys hence any volatility in aid inflows does not seem to matter for agricultural output. 
Consistent with our hypothesis, the damaging effect of aid volatility on sectoral growth in 
SSA is weakened by a well-developed financial system with a large dampening impact on the 
tradable sector (such as manufacturing) and a no apparent influence on agriculture. To the 
extent that aid provides more resources to governments of the recipient countries by far 
reduces the crowding out of the private sector stemming from government borrowing from 
financial sector consequently freeing credit to the private sector.  
The main thrust of this paper is that, aid can generate positive sectoral value addition 
conditioned on the level of local financial sector. Our results reveal that larger size of 
financial markets increases sectors’ “financial” stabilizing capacity, enabling authorities to 
administer aid inflows in a manner that spurs aid delivery and effectiveness. Our empirical 
evidence therefore provides unequivocal support for the notion that development of domestic 
financial markets by far enhances aid effectiveness. With this, the paper unearths critical 
findings that call for further development of local financial systems. What is needed is for 
Central banks of SSA countries to identify the threshold of financial development consistent 
with sectoral growth. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Foreign aid and agricultural sector [Average: 1983 – 2014] 
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Appendix B: Foreign aid and manufacturing sector [Average: 1983 – 2014] 
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Appendix C: Foreign aid and service sector [Average: 1983 – 2014] 
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Appendix D: Descriptive statistics (1983–2014) 
 
Agriculture Service Manufacturing Aid Inflation 
Institutional 
quality 
Gross fixed 
capital 
formation 
Government 
expenditure 
Labour 
Trade 
openness 
Domestic 
credit 
Mean 42.646 19.233 38.075 16.748 26.449 2.94 21.183 12.311 50.450 60.050 16.087 
Median 42.354 18.276 38.768 14.820 21.908 2.03 21.512 11.579 50.386 61.247 14.692 
Maximum 51.849 27.549 44.162 29.404 122.875 3.51 31.010 17.577 52.347 83.564 39.127 
Minimum 35.033 14.179 30.258 10.209 8.727 1.94 12.149 8.432 49.584 47.064 10.268 
Std. Dev. 4.520 3.771 3.157 4.888 21.803 2.10 3.690 2.764 0.635 8.848 5.571 
Skewness 0.231 0.542 -0.806 0.783 2.882 0.13 -0.308 0.497 1.354 0.416 2.372 
Source: Authors’ calculations using WDI. 
 
 
Appendix E: Correlation coefficients 
 
Agriculture Service Manufacturing Aid Inflation 
Institutional 
quality 
Gross fixed 
capital 
formation 
Government 
expenditure 
Labour 
Trade 
openness 
Domestic 
credit 
Agriculture 1.000 
    
 
     
Service -0.719 1.000 
   
 
     
Industry -0.562 -0.170 1.000 
  
 
     
Aid 0.469 -0.596 0.057 1.000 
 
 
     
Inflation 0.330 -0.367 -0.027 0.289 1.000  
     
Institutional quality 0.031 0.252 0.132 0.111 -0.180 1.000 
     
Gross fixed capital 
formation 
0.075 0.351 -0.519 -0.115 -0.262 0.222 1.000 
    
Government 
expenditure 
0.125 -0.402 0.272 -0.138 -0.208 -0.065 -0.211 1.000 
   
Labour -0.350 -0.075 0.591 0.241 0.418 -0.116 -0.627 -0.145 1.000 
  
Trade openness -0.532 0.753 -0.148 -0.457 -0.396 0.094 0.304 -0.148 -0.032 1.000 
 
Domestic credit -0.208 -0.202 0.550 0.185 0.548 0.463 -0.525 -0.086 0.756 -0.223 1.000 
Source: Authors’ calculations using WDI. 
